Professional Kaco Lemo manufacturer is located in China, including Paper Clips,Gel Ink Pen,Color Gel Pen, etc.
Kaco Lemo,Paper Clips,Gel Ink Pen,Color Gel Pen,Metal Ruler
Offer Kaco Lemo,Paper Clips,Gel Ink Pen From China Manufacturer
Professional Kaco Lemo manufacturer is located in China, including Paper Clips,Gel Ink Pen,Color Gel Pen, etc.
Kaco Lemo,Paper Clips,Gel Ink Pen,Color Gel Pen,Metal Ruler
Offer Kaco Lemo,Paper Clips,Gel Ink Pen From China Manufacturer
Kaco Lemo,Paper Clips,Gel Ink Pen,Color Gel Pen,Metal Ruler​ Shenzhen Newway Technology Co., Ltd. , https://www.sznewways.com
I. Brief summary of the accident Qitian Company is located in Yangliuzhuang, Baoxing Community, Lianran Town, Anning City, Kunming, and is a wholly-owned corporate limited liability company. In January 2007, it obtained a safety production license for dangerous chemicals production enterprises. The main product is superphosphate, with a production capacity of 100,000 tons/year.
In early June 2008, Monkey company due to market reasons, after laboratory tests to determine their own superphosphate production plant instead of feed calcium hydrogen production plant, own design, installation, alteration equipment, pilot production. The production of calcium hydrogen phosphate first requires arsenic removal from phosphoric acid. The process is to react with arsenic in phosphoric acid with sodium sulfide solution to produce arsenic sulfide, which is removed by precipitation and dephosphorization to produce refined phosphoric acid. The arsenic-refined phosphoric acid process is accompanied by the production of hydrogen sulfide gas.
At 18:30 on June 12, the operator placed an aqueous sodium sulfide solution in the sodium sulfide aqueous solution distribution tank, opened the bottom valve, and added an aqueous sodium sulfide solution to the phosphate tank. At 19:30, when the operator regulated the valve, he found that the valve could not be closed. Since no emergency measures were taken, the aqueous solution of sodium sulfide continued to flow into the phosphate tank, causing a large excess of sodium sulfide in the phosphate tank, resulting in a large amount of hydrogen sulfide gas The escape of the upper part of the closed phosphate trough led to the poisoning of some on-site workers and those who came to the rescue, resulting in 6 deaths and 29 poisonings (2 of them were seriously injured).
According to the preliminary analysis of the accident investigation team, there is a defect in the arsenic refining process design, and the outlet pipe of the sodium sulfide aqueous solution configuration tank is not equipped with a device capable of automatically displaying and controlling the flow rate of the sodium sulfide aqueous solution. Only the operator can observe the speed of the liquid level drop. The flow rate of the sodium sulfide aqueous solution is controlled by manually adjusting the valve, and it is this valve that is out of control, resulting in that all of the sodium sulfide aqueous solution in the sodium sulfide aqueous solution distribution tank flows into the phosphoric acid tank to generate a large amount of hydrogen sulfide, which is a direct cause of this accident. Phosphate groove top unblocked, with no harmful gas collection and treatment facilities and detection (alarm) instrument; hydrogen sulfide gas was added to the aqueous solution of sodium phosphate slot orifice installed in the upper surface of the phosphoric acid bath, resulting in a rapid reaction in air Diffusion is an important reason for this accident.
II. Problems Exposed by the Accidents (1) The Qitian company's reconstruction project organizes the construction, construction, and installation of equipment without formal design, safety license, or safety facilities. It is an illegal construction project.
(II) Qitian used the experimental process directly for industrial production, and established a chemical plant and organized a trial production for the hazardous process accompanied by hydrogen sulfide gas without a safety argument. The safety management of the trial production process was confusing. In the case where the installation of all equipment was not completed, and a careful commissioning scheme was not formulated, trial production was carried out while constructing. There is no identification of the risk factors that may arise in the trial production process. There are no safety measures, no emergency plans, and a trial production by the organization has led to accidents.
(3) Qitian Company's on-site operating personnel had poor safety awareness, lacked awareness of the dangers of process technology and related knowledge of emergency rescue, and did not take emergency measures after the valve became out of control. In the rescue process, rescue workers did not take preventive measures and blindly rescued, leading to further expansion of casualties.
III. Relevant Requirements (1) Effectively strengthen the supervision and control of dangerous chemicals construction projects. The construction of new, reconstructed, and expanded hazardous chemicals construction projects shall strictly implement the systems of establishing safety review, reviewing the design of safety facilities, checking and accepting safety facilities, and trial production (use) plans. Hazardous chemicals construction projects must be designed by qualified design institutes, and construction and project supervision must be undertaken by qualified entities. To strengthen safety supervision of dangerous chemicals projects in the pre-production process, the construction unit shall be reported to the appropriate pilot production program of safety supervision departments for the record, qualified safety supervision departments should conduct a review of the safety pilot production program. For trial production projects that have not been filed, all trial production activities shall be ordered by law and penalties shall be imposed in accordance with relevant regulations.
(B) the safety supervision departments at all levels should strictly dangerous chemicals construction projects "three simultaneous" management, strict project access and security, in accordance with relevant laws, regulations and requirements documents, earnestly carry out dangerous chemicals work permit Project Safety . For chemical companies to process characteristics, dangers may arise during the pre-production of risk identification and analysis, development of contingency plans, it is strictly prohibited "lab" process without a safety demonstration, direct amplification used in industrial production. It is necessary to strengthen the training of post-operators' safety awareness, ability to prevent accidents, and emergency disposal capabilities to ensure safe production.
(3) Deepening the investigation and management of hidden dangers in hazardous chemicals and chemical companies. Combining with the current special operations for the 100-day supervision of production safety, we will continue to deepen the investigation and treatment of safety hazards in chemical companies and the work of safety production rectification. Enterprises should follow the guidance of the self-examination and self-restructuring of chemical industry safety production in the document No. 9 (2007) of the Security Committee of the State Council Security Committee Office of the Security Committee, conduct in-depth investigations, and promptly eliminate potential safety hazards. The security regulatory departments in various localities shall strengthen the daily supervision of enterprises that use dangerous technologies, enterprises that have suffered casualties, enterprises that have problems in safe distance, poor basic conditions, and small-scale production and operation enterprises.
(d) Gradually draw lessons from accidents to avoid the occurrence of hydrogen sulfide poisoning accidents. Safety supervisory departments at all levels must strengthen safety supervision and control over production and business entities that may produce toxic hydrogen gas such as hydrogen sulfide and other poisonous gases such as sulfur-containing crude oil processing, natural gas extraction, chemical refining, desulfurization, sewage pipeline cleaning, organic material fermentation and corruption, and food marinating. . According to the "State Administration of Work Safety on hydrogen sulfide poisoning this year have occurred since the rescue casualties due to the blind expansion of the accident informed" (Work Safety total hazardous [2007] No. 187) requirements, the unit easy to accumulate and produce hydrogen sulfide Equipment, equipment, facilities and key locations, and other dangerous workplaces that produce toxic and hazardous gases to conduct a comprehensive survey and risk identification; establish and improve safety management systems for preventing poisoning and suffocation, equipped with appropriate safety protection equipment, and establish poisoning before operations And suffocation hazard identification system, and carry out scientific rescue emergency drills.
Please forward this notification to relevant departments and chemical companies in your jurisdiction.
State Administration of Work Safety Supervision, June 26, 2008
Circular of the State Administration of Safety Supervision on the "6.12" H2S Poisoning Incident of Kunming Anning Qitian Chemical Fertilizer Co., Ltd. of Yunnan Province Safety Supervision Zong Huhuan (2008) No. 129 provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the Central Government and Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Safety Production Supervision Authority: At 19:40 on June 12, 2008, Kunming Anning Qitian Fertilizer Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Qitian Company) of Kunming City, Yunnan Province, suffered from hydrogen sulfide poisoning during the arsenic removal process of purified phosphoric acid production, resulting in 6 deaths and 29 people. Poisoning. In order to draw lessons from the accident, we will resolutely curb the trend of accidents in the hazardous chemicals field and prevent the recurrence of similar accidents. The situation of the “6.12†hydrogen sulfide poisoning accident and related requirements of Qitian Company are hereby notified as follows:
February 20, 2023